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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
______________ 
 
No. 18-2221 
______________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
REGINALD HARRIS, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-14-cr-00244-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 24, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 21, 2019) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Reginald Harris appeals his sentence for crimes related to a tax fraud scheme he 
ran out of several Pennsylvania prisons.  He contests two offense level enhancements 
based on loss amount and leadership role, and the denial of a reduction in offense level 
for acceptance of responsibility.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment of conviction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
While incarcerated, Reginald Harris conspired with fellow inmates Roiann 
Johnson and Anthony Nalls to prepare fraudulent tax returns on behalf of other inmates.  
Harris and his co-conspirators sought and used names, social security numbers, and other 
information from non-incarcerated individuals to artificially maximize tax credits on the 
returns.  They worked with relatives and friends, such as Dennis Naylor and Tyrone 
Gossett, who provided Harris and his co-conspirators with addresses outside of the prison 
where the refund checks could be mailed.  Naylor and Gossett also forged the signatures 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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of refund recipients in order to deposit the checks into bank accounts they had established 
for this scheme.   
After an investigation, Harris was charged in an indictment in October 2014 with 
one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and mail fraud from September 2009 to 
December 2012, and one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States for the same 
time period.   
In August 2015, Harris pleaded guilty to both counts, without a plea agreement.  
The Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report recommending an 
offense level based on the total loss amount in the conspiracy, a four-point enhancement 
for Harris’s leadership role, and a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  
The Government objected to the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, arguing that 
Harris continued to commit crimes after pleading guilty.  Harris entered an objection to 
the Probation Office’s calculation of the loss amount and the leadership role attributed to 
him. 
At the District Court’s initial hearing on the disputed sentencing factors, the 
Government presented testimony that the actual loss amount of the conspiracy in the time 
period charged totaled $248,170.03, but that the intended loss was over $250,000.  After 
the hearing, the Government filed a Supplemental Sentencing Memorandum alleging that 
Harris had engaged in additional criminal activity related to the tax fraud scheme after his 
change of plea, resulting in additional intended loss.  The District Court held two 
 4 
 
additional hearings on the disputed sentencing factors in February 2017 and October 
2017, ultimately concluding: (1) the loss amount enhancement was appropriate because 
the loss amount attributable to Harris was in excess of $250,000; (2) Harris was the 
leader of the criminal enterprise; and (3) Harris had not sufficiently accepted 
responsibility to qualify for a reduction in offense level.  It determined Harris’s 
Guidelines range to be 92–115 months and entered a sentence of 96 months’ 
imprisonment.  The District Court also imposed a supervised release term of five years 
and three years on the two counts, respectively, to run concurrently with the supervised 
release term for his ongoing sentence.   
Harris filed a timely appeal.     
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
Since Harris’s three grounds on appeal challenge the District Court’s factual 
findings, this Court will review for clear error.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 
(3d Cir. 2007) (review for factual findings relevant to the Guidelines is for clear error).  A 
factual conclusion is clearly erroneous when, upon review, there is a “definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.”  Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. 
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (citations omitted).   
III. ANALYSIS 
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A. Loss Amount 
Harris contends the District Court erred in including losses that resulted from the 
actions of his co-conspirators as attributable to him.  He argues that his loss amount 
should be limited to the approximately $32,000 from fees he charged other inmates for 
preparing fraudulent returns and from the refund checks deposited into his bank account 
and should not include the amounts deposited into his co-conspirators’ accounts.   
The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide for increases in offense level for 
fraud conspiracies where the loss amount exceeds $6,500.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).  The 
loss amount is considered the “greater of actual loss or intended loss.”  § 2B1.1, cmt. 
n.3(A).  The loss calculation is based on the scope of the “relevant conduct,” which 
includes “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, 
induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that occurred during the 
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course 
of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.”  §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)-
(B).  It also includes conduct within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, 
taken in furtherance of the activity, and in connection with that activity so long as it was 
reasonably foreseeable.  §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).  Where offenses require grouping of multiple 
counts, the Guidelines provide that the “relevant conduct” additionally comprises “all 
acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme 
or plan as the offense of conviction[.]”  § 1B1.3(a)(2).   
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Harris does not contest the mathematical calculation of actual loss or intended loss 
of the whole conspiracy, but makes three arguments challenging the District Court’s 
conclusion that the “relevant conduct” to consider for purposes of calculating the loss 
amount included the criminal actions of Johnson, Nalls, Naylor, and Gossett between 
September 2009 and December 2012, and Harris’s post-indictment conduct in 2015.  
First, Harris argues that his actions were insufficient for the District Court to have 
determined that he “aided, abetted and induced” the criminal conduct of his co-
conspirators and that their actions could constitute “jointly undertaken criminal activity.”  
Unfortunately for Harris, he conceded that he taught Nalls, Johnson, and other inmates 
how to complete fraudulent tax returns.  This evidence, cited by the District Court in its 
findings as to sentencing matters, demonstrates Harris’s “affirmative participation which 
at least encourage[d] the perpetrator.”  United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d 879, 885 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (describing the standard for establishing aiding and abetting in the filing of 
false tax returns) (citations omitted). 
But there was more.  Harris and Nalls worked together, with Harris preparing the 
returns and Nalls obtaining identities from individuals outside of prison to use as 
dependents on tax returns.  Harris contacted Naylor, through Nalls, for the purpose of 
having Naylor cash refund checks.  Harris admitted to using Naylor’s address and bank 
accounts to receive and deposit refund checks.  Naylor introduced Harris to Gossett, 
whom Harris continued to rely upon to deposit checks.  Harris also admitted to giving 
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Johnson tax advice and introducing him to Naylor, who could deposit Johnson’s refund 
checks.   
Second, he argues that the District Court erred in finding that his conduct was 
“jointly undertaken” with his co-conspirators.  Determining whether a defendant’s 
actions were “jointly undertaken” under the Guidelines requires a “searching and 
individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each defendant’s involvement 
in the conspiracy.”  United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 995 (3d Cir. 1992).  Merely 
finding a defendant’s contributions to the scheme to be “substantial” is not enough for the 
defendant’s actions to be considered “jointly taken,” but the individualized assessment 
requirement does not mean, as Harris contends, that the Guidelines necessitate a finding 
that Harris and each of his co-conspirators were personally involved in every aspect of 
the conspiracy.  It is sufficient that Harris taught Nalls, Johnson, and other inmates how 
to file the false returns and worked with Naylor and Gossett to cash the checks for it to be 
reasonably foreseeable by Harris that Nalls, Johnson, Naylor, and Gossett would file false 
returns and deposit fraudulent refund checks into their accounts.  See id.; see also United 
States v. Pizarro-Berrios, 448 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding the loss amount in a 
bank fraud scheme foreseeable to the defendant who was involved with the scheme from 
the beginning, knew the leaders of the scheme, and knew the details of the scheme).  
Based on this evidence, the District Court did not err in determining that Harris aided and 
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abetted his co-conspirators and that Harris and his co-conspirators’ conduct fell within 
the parameters of the “jointly undertaken” prong. 
Finally, Harris contends that the District Court should not have considered his 
2015 conduct as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the 
offense of conviction.  Again, the evidence contradicts his argument. 
The Guidelines define “common scheme or plan” as two or more offenses that are 
“substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common 
victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3, cmt. n.5(B)(i).  Harris’s 2015 actions, which include the deposit of a fraudulent 
tax refund check and numerous calls recruiting new co-conspirators all after entering a 
guilty plea, plainly qualify under this definition.   
Harris briefly points out the fraudulent refund derived from his own tax return and 
concludes that it should not count as evidence towards a common scheme.  But this 
argument does not change the fact that these were the same tactics Harris had previously 
used to falsify tax returns, the United States remained the victim of Harris’s conduct, and 
the false return had the same intended purpose.  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
found Harris’s 2015 conduct to be part of the same course of conduct or common scheme 
or plan such that it should be considered “relevant conduct” in determining the loss 
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amount.1  The evidence clearly supports the District Court’s decision to attribute the 
conspiracy’s over $250,000 of intended losses to Harris.  Accordingly, the District Court 
properly increased Harris’s offense level by twelve pursuant to Section 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) of 
the Guidelines.   
 
 
B. Leadership Role 
Next, Harris asserts the District Court erred by imposing the four-point 
enhancement for a leadership role in the conspiracy.   
Section 3B1.1(a) of the Guidelines allows for a four-level increase for a defendant 
who was an “organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more 
participants or was otherwise extensive.”  In determining whether the defendant was an 
organizer or leader, the Guidelines counsel a district court to consider “the exercise of 
decision making authority” and degree of control over other co-conspirators, “the degree 
of participation in planning or organizing the offense,” including the recruitment of 
accomplices, any claims to larger shares of the profits from the crime, and generally the 
                                              
1 While Harris does not appear to challenge the calculation of the loss amount, it is 
also clear that the Government presented sufficient evidence that the intended loss 
amounts attributable to Harris, Johnson, Nalls, Naylor, and Gossett between September 
2009 and December 2012 and to Harris in 2015 exceeded $250,000.  United States v. 
Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 322 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that “a sentencing court need only 
make a ‘reasonable estimate’ of loss that is based on the available evidence in the record” 
(citation omitted)). 
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nature and scope of the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, 
cmt. n.4.  The sentencing court need not make a finding on every factor for a defendant to 
be found an organizer or leader of the criminal activity.  See United States v. Ortiz, 878 
F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1989).  Nor must the court find the defendant played a direct role 
in every aspect of the conspiracy in order to consider the defendant an organizer or 
leader.  See United States v. Bass, 54 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A person who plans, 
funds and supervises a conspiracy’s operation does not immunize himself from upward 
adjustment under § 3B1.1 just because he does not join in all of the mechanics and all of 
the various activities of the illegal enterprise.”).  
Without citing to the record, Harris asserts that he did not have decision-making 
authority and the extent of his participation was limited to answering questions and 
instructing others in tax return preparation.  But the evidence presented at trial belies this 
assertion.  By Harris’s own admission, he instructed other inmates on falsifying tax 
returns.  He recruited Naylor into the scheme to open bank accounts and deposit refund 
checks.  There was evidence that Harris also recruited others to open bank accounts and 
find information for other individuals to falsify on the tax returns.  This evidence points 
to Harris’s outsized role in the conspiracy and supports the District Court’s decision to 
assess the four-level enhancement.  There is no clear error here. 
C. Acceptance of Responsibility 
 11 
 
Finally, Harris challenges the District Court’s decision to deny a three-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  The Guidelines provide that a defendant may 
receive a two-level reduction if the defendant “clearly” demonstrates acceptance of 
responsibility.  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).2  This Court has repeatedly found that continued 
criminal activity after an indictment is inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility.  
See United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1996). 
In addition to the tax refund deposit based on his false tax return described above, 
the Government presented evidence of intercepted calls in 2015, after Harris had pleaded 
guilty, in which Harris was implicated in the filing of fraudulent returns on behalf of 
another individual, Keontae Spears.  In other intercepted calls in 2015, Harris advised 
contacts outside the prison to find dependents to list to inflate the tax credits on tax 
returns.  Nevertheless, Harris argues that the 2015 phone calls were not related to the tax 
fraud scheme and that the District Court interpreted the calls incorrectly.   
Although he appears to challenge a factual interpretation, he also advocates for 
plenary review.  Since the District Court’s decision did not rest on an interpretation of the 
Guidelines, Harris is not entitled to plenary review.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 
570 (3d Cir. 2007) (reserving plenary review of a district court’s interpretation of the 
                                              
2 A defendant may qualify for an additional one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 
3E1.1(b) if the government moves for the reduction.  Harris does not qualify for the 
additional one-level decrease because the Government did not so move.  Therefore, the 
maximum possible reduction for acceptance of responsibility in this case is two levels. 
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Guidelines).  As such, we review the Court’s factual conclusions for clear error.  In doing 
so, we find the District Court properly considered the evidence and we find no error in 
the Court’s conclusion that the “the Defendant [was] plainly marching forward in leading 
others through the twists and turns of preparing fraudulent federal tax returns using 
phony ID information” on the 2015 post-plea phone calls.   
We shall affirm the District Court’s finding that Harris had not sufficiently 
accepted responsibility to qualify for the downward adjustment. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We find that the District Court did not commit clear error in applying offense-
level increases based on the loss amount and leadership role. Nor did it commit clear 
error by denying an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility in sentencing 
Appellant Reginald Harris.  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction.  
